Framing and Minimum Levels in Public Good Provision

Peter Martinsson, Haileselassie Medhin and Emil Persson

No 656, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice architecture of framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts with a policy intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find that cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results therefore stress the importance of choosing the frame when making policy recommendations.

Keywords: Choice architecture; Framing; Public goods; Minimum level; Experiment; Ethiopia. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pub and nep-res
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