Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games

Lea Heursen, Eva Ranehill and Roberto A Weber
Additional contact information
Lea Heursen: Department of Economics, Humboldt University Berlin
Roberto A Weber: Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden

No 796, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study whether one reason behind female underrepresentation in leadership is that female leaders are less effective at coordinating action by followers. Two experiments using coordination games investigate whether female leaders are less successful than males in persuading followers to coordinate on efficient equilibria. Group performance hinges on higher-order beliefs about the leader’s capacity to convince followers to pursue desired actions, making beliefs that women are less effective leaders potentially self-confirming. We find no evidence that such bias impacts actual leadership performance, identifying a precisely-estimated null effect. We show that this absence of an effect is surprising given experts’ priors.

Keywords: gender; coordination games; leadership; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D23 J10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 84 pages
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gen, nep-gth and nep-lab
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Related works:
Working Paper: Are Women Less Effective Leaders than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games (2023)
Working Paper: Are Women Less Effective Leaders Than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games (2020)
Working Paper: Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games (2020)
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