All it takes is one: The effect of weakest-link and summation aggregation on public good provision under threshold uncertainty

Fredrik Carlsson, Claes Ek () and Andreas Lange ()
Additional contact information
Claes Ek: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden, https://economics.gu.se/
Andreas Lange: University of Hamburg

No 813, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We report experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods under threshold uncertainty. By explicitly comparing two prominent technologies, summation and weakest link, we show that uncertainty is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low contributions by one subject cannot be compensated by others. In contrast, threshold uncertainty does not affect contributions under summation. We demonstrate non-binding pledges as one mechanism to improve chances of threshold attainment under both technologies, yet in particular under weakest link.

Keywords: public goods; threshold uncertainty; weakest link; coordination; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2021-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-res
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Working Paper: All It Takes Is One: The Effect of Weakest-Link and Summation Aggregation on Public Good Provision under Threshold Uncertainty (2021)
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