Downward Accountability in Response to Collective Actions: The Political Economy of Public Goods Provision in China

Yuan Li

No 2013-26, Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute

Abstract: Will autocratic governments implement policies to satisfy the people’s demands in order to prevent large scale social unrest? This paper explores this question through quantitatively analysis of the political economy of public goods provision in Chinese provinces. I collected data on the number of labor disputes to measure collective actions. My sample includes provincial leaders whose incentives to deliver public goods can either be explained as a result of upward accountability towards the Center or downward accountability towards the citizens. The confounding factor of upward accountability is ruled out by using two-step estimation; and the reverse causality between public goods provision and collective actions is controlled by using instrumental variables. Result suggests that provincial leaders will implement policies more in favor of the citizens in response to intensified labor disputes.

Keywords: Accountability; Collective Actions; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H11 H40 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2013-08-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-nps, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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