Buyer Quality and Procurement Outcomes: Explorative Evidence From the US
Francesco Decarolis (),
Vincenzo Mollisi () and
Leonardo Maria Giuffrida ()
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Vincenzo Mollisi: University of Rome Tor Vergata
No 41, SITE Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
We explore empirically the impact of buyer quality on public procurement outcomes. Using purchases data (Federal Procurement Data System) and survey data (Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey) from US federal agencies, we find that procurement quality is highly heterogeneous across different agencies and persistent over time. The qualitative aspect that better predicts procurement performance is the perceived degree of cooperation within the unit, followed by the presence of appropriate incentives. We then assess the main channels through which public procurer quality affects outcomes. We find that buyer quality improves the selection of suppliers and strengthens the association between the use of cost plus contracts and the negotiation procedure.
Keywords: Buyer Quality; Competence; Management practices; Procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H11 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hasite:0041
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