Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers: A Short Survey
Giancarlo Spagnolo and
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Theo Nyreröd: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
No 50, SITE Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
Whistleblower reward programs, or “bounty regimes”, are increasingly used in the United States. The effectiveness of these programs have been questioned, and empirical evidence on their effectiveness have been scarce likely due to their relatively recent introduction. In recent years, however, empirical and experimental evidence on their effectiveness have become more available and robust. We review the (rather encouraging) evidence on whistleblower reward programs, in terms of amount of additional information generated, deterrence effects, and administration costs, and consider the possibility of extending them to accomplice-witnesses in antitrust.
Keywords: whistleblowers; economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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