An elementary axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept

Mark Voorneveld ()
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Mark Voorneveld: Dept. of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 2019:1, SSE Working Paper Series in Economics from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is `strategically irrelevant', then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solution of the game; (iii) if all players agree that a certain strategy profile is optimal, then this strategy profile is a solution of the game.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; axiomatization; solution concept (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2019-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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