On the Optimal Value and Protection of a Patent

Per-Olov Johansson () and Karl-Gustaf Löfgren
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Per-Olov Johansson: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 24, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: In this note, we analyze the behavior of a firm that has a (stochastic) market power due to a patent. For example, we show how to handle the stock aspects of R&D activities (the accumulation of human capital in a firm). In fact, when the R&D stock enters the survival probability of the firm's market power, we do not have a standard optimal control problem. We show how to handle this complication and its implications for the optimal R&D strategy. We also show how to interpret the current value Hamiltonian in terms of the interrest on expected future present value profits. Finally, drawing on resent results on the dynamic envelope theorem, we provide an interpretation of our results in terms of the question whether the market is biased against risky R&D.

Keywords: Patents; R&D; market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1994-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0024

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