Trade unions, employee share ownership and wage setting: A supply-side approach to the share economy

Thomas I. Renström and Kasper Roszbach ()

No 65, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Employee share ownership is growing increasingly important. This paper studies employee share ownership in an economy with one monopoly union for each firm. We modify an implicit contra t model by adding dividend income to the usual wage income. Union members differ in exogenous stock endowments and choose wages under majority rule. As a result, wages are decreasing in stock endowments and a skewed distribution of stoc k-capital leads to higher wages and lower employment. Switching to a more equal distribution can increase employment and production. An optimal portfolio rule suggests that macroeconomic gains can be made from limiting the diversification of portfolios. Last, we show how the transfer of shares to employees can be made economically feasible.

Keywords: Trade unions; profit sharing; distribuion; voting; portfolio choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D72 G11 J30 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1995-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0065

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