 Delegation as at threat in bargainingBjörn Segendorff
No 107, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics Abstract: in a bargaining game over the provision of a public good, two principals appoint one agent each to carry out the bargaining. Each agent has preferences over the outcome. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. By authority is here meant the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium both principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of no bargaining (autarchy), but at least one of the principals is worse off compared to bargaining without delegation. The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy. Keywords: Strategic delegation; Nash bargaining solution (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, pages 266-283. There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0107 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.