Rationality, Transparency, and Evolutionary Selection

Karl Wärneryd

No 167, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We discuss attempts to justify conditional cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma based on the idea of identifying an opponent’s strategy. We note that the concept of such complete transparency of decision procedures is logically inconsistent. Furthermore, we observe that attempts to justify indirect transparency on evolutionary grounds, by the development of physical characteristics that signal behavior, must fail. Finally, we suggest a model of partial transparency that is logically consistent and generates conditional cooperation.

Keywords: Rationality; evolution; cooperation; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1997-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0167

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