Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization

Karl Wärneryd

No 173, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: The paper explores the implications for explaining the endogenous formation of jurisdictions of modelling the political process as a costly fight to acquire shares of the GNP pie. It is shown, in particular, that a system of federalism is especially significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict. Less resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierarchical system of federalism than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central government. Furthermore, if mobility is costless, then a form of federalism may be preferred by all agents even if it destroys resources.

Keywords: Federalism; contests; rent seeking; jurisdictions; centralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1997-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 1998, pages 435-450.

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Journal Article: Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0173

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