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Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness

Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander and Lars-Erik Öller
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Johan Karlander: Department of Mathematics, Postal: Royal Institute of Technology, S-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

No 201, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We study a simple model of the job market, where workers are assigned to employers. We specify conditions under which the market is hierarchical in a natural sense. For such hierarchies, we can state explicit values for the earnings in the worker-optimal and employer-optimal solutions. This is a discrete analogue to the Ricardian differential rent model of Sattinger (1979). We discuss the compatibility problems between fairness and stability of earnings and assignments and argue for a certain solution.

Keywords: Hierarchies; assignment; fairness; envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1997-10-27
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000, pages 109-118.

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Working Paper: Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness (1996) Downloads
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