Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

Kai Konrad, Wolfgang Peters and Karl Wärneryd
Additional contact information
Wolfgang Peters: The European University Viadrina, Postal: Grosse Scharrnstrasse 59, D-15230 Frankfurt/Oder, Germany

No 316, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.

Keywords: First-price all-pay auctions; contests; strategic delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1999-04-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0316

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