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Squandering European Labor: Social Safety Nets in Times of Economic Turbulence

Lars Ljungqvist

No 321, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: This paper reviews the argument that high long-term unemployment in Europe is caused by generous social safety nets in times of economic turbulence. We report on the empirical evidence of a more turbulent economic environment and present the theoretical arguments that establish a link between turbulence and high unemployment. We conclude that a cure to the European unemployment problem must entail a reform of the unemployment insurance system so that benefits decline over the unemployment spell. If the social consensus in Europe makes it difficult to implement declining benefits, we suggest that a complementary way of providing incentives for the unemployed would be to reduce their leisure by imposing work requirements.

Keywords: European unemployment; economic turbulence; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1999-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-ltv
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1999, pages 367-388.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0321

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