Monitoring and Pay: General results

Magnus Allgulin
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Magnus Allgulin: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 340, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the opitmal incentives for motivating a risk neutral, wealth constrained agent. In particular, monitoring and pay are shown to be complementary instruments under very general conditions, extending earlier results by Allgulin and Ellingsen (1998). The paper also proves that linear incentive schemes are strictly sub-optimal in this setting.

Keywords: Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1999-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-lab and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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