Clever agents in adaptive learning

Alexander Matros

No 403, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.

Keywords: Evolution; game theory; bounded rationality; Markov chain; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2000-10-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Clever agents in adaptive learning (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0403

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