Preparation and toolkit learning

Mark Voorneveld

No 485, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.

Keywords: noncooperative games; inertia; status quo bias; adaptive play; procedural rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2002-01-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0485

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