An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Mark Voorneveld, Willemien Kets and Henk Norde

No 589, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.

Keywords: Minimal curb sets; Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2005-03-04, Revised 2005-03-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory.

Downloads: (external link)
http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0589.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets (2006)
Journal Article: An axiomatization of minimal curb sets (2005)
Working Paper: An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets (2005)
Working Paper: An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0589

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Helena Lundin ().