Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games

Mark Voorneveld and Helena Fagraeus Lundström
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Helena Fagraeus Lundström: Dept. of Mathematics, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

No 605, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that ``better'' responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of ``worse'' responses --- most of Thompson's ``inessential'' transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.

Keywords: Extensive form games; Quantal response equilibrium; Logit model; Strategic equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2005-10-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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