Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Geir Asheim, Mark Voorneveld and Jörgen Weibull

No 714, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

Keywords: epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2009-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0714

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