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Finding all minimal CURB sets

Max Klimm () and Jörgen Weibull
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Max Klimm: Technische Universität Berlin, Postal: Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany

No 722, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is strongly closed under rational behavior, or sCURB, if it contains all best replies to all probabilistic beliefs over the set. We present an algorithm that computes all minimal sCURB sets in any given finite game. Runtime measurements on two-player games (where the concepts of CURB and sCURB coincide) show that the algorithm is considerably faster than the earlier developed algorithm, that of Benisch et al. (2006).

Keywords: curb sets; rational behavior; rationalizability; minimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C62 C63 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Finding all minimal curb sets (2009) Downloads
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