Rent Seeking and Organizational Structure

Karl Wärneryd

No 749, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

Keywords: rent seeking; contests; hierarchy; ownership of firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D74 G32 G34 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2014-06-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0749.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0749

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Helena Lundin ().