Assessing the effect of public policy on worker absenteeism

Per Johansson and Mårten Palme

No 2002:13, Working Paper Series from IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

Abstract: We analyze the effect of economic incentives on worker absenteeism, using panel data on work absence for 1990 and 1991 with a sample of 1,396 Swedish blue-collar workers. During this period Sweden implemented major reforms of both its national income replacement program for short-term sickness and income taxes. Both affected the worker's cost of missing work. Our econometric model allows for state-dependent dynamic behavior and control for unobserved heterogeneity. The latter proves to be an important consideration. We find that the cost of being absent significantly affects work absence behavior.

Keywords: Sickness insurance; unobserved heterogeneity; logit regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2001-06-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Published in Journal of Human Resources , 2002, pages 381-409.

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Journal Article: Assessing the Effect of Public Policy on Worker Absenteeism (2002)
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