When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? - Aid Dependence and Conditionality

Jakob Svensson

No 600, Seminar Papers from Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies

Abstract: In spite a vast amount of both theoretical and empirical work on foreign assistance and development, little is known about the incentive effects of aid. In fact, recent surveys of aid only briefly mention the possibility of moral hazard situations in the recipient-donor relation, but conclude that conditionality is a way to deal with the problem. However, in this paper we show that an aid contract, as proposed in the literature, is not time-consistent. This may be one explanation for the poor results of the vast amount of foreign aid disbursed to the developing world. Moreover, we show that tied aid, or delegation to a donor agency with less aversion to poverty may improve the equilibrium for all parties in the discretionary environment. Finally, we provide some evidence supporting the basic idea of the paper, namely that aid induces weak fiscal discipline and that increased fiscal difficulties lead to higher inflow of aid.

Keywords: foreign aid; moral hazard; tied aid; fiscal discipline; fiscal difficulties; inflow of aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1997-11-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Development Economics, 2000, pages 61-84.

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Related works:
Journal Article: When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality (2000)
Working Paper: When is foreign aid policy credible: aid dependence and conditionality (1997)
Working Paper: When Is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0600

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