Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts

Nils-Petter Lagerlof ()

No 624, Seminar Papers from Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies

Abstract: O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) have shown that the dynamic inefficiency result of a standard gift model is reversed if parents can undersave strategically. I impose an explicit non-negativity constraint on gifts, which - for all numerical examples suggested by O'Connell and Zeldes - alters this result, by making gifts non-operative. However, for other realistic numerical examples, this is not the case.

Keywords: Dynamic efficiency; Altruism; Gifts; Overlapping generations; Saving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1997-10-31
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0624

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