COLLUSION-PROOF YARDSTICK COMPETITION

Thomas Tangerås ()

No 674, Seminar Papers from Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition. The central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private information and are unable to communicate later. It is shown that optimal collusion-proof regulation demands more high-powered (low-powered) incentives to high-productivity (low-productivity) firms than prescribed by the second-best contract. Collusion is costly to society also when correlation of private information is near perfect. This contrasts with the result by Laffont and Martimort (1998b), that the cost of collusion vanishes in the limit.

Keywords: Yardstick competition; collusion; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1999-11-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
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http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:328348/FULLTEXT01 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Collusion-proof yardstick competition (2002)
Working Paper: Collusion-Proof Yardstick Competition (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0674

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