Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms

Jakob Svensson

No 713, Seminar Papers from Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper uses an unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features; not all firms report they need to pay bribes; and, there is a considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. To explain these patterns we construct a simple bargaining model. The model yields predictions on both the incidence and the level of graft. Consistent with the model we find that variation in policies/regulations (across industries) explain the incidence of corruption, while variation in profitability and technology choice explain the variation in bribes for the group of bribe paying firms. These findings suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are endogenously determined in order to extract bribes.

Keywords: TBA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2002-05-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003.

Downloads: (external link)
http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:343782/FULLTEXT01 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms (2003)
Working Paper: Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0713

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