The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime
Mats Persson and
Claes-Henric Siven ()
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Claes-Henric Siven: Department of Economics, Postal: Stockholm University, S-106 69 Stockholm, Sweden, http://people.su.se/~siven/
No 741, Seminar Papers from Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies
Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in Becker’s (1968) model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.
Keywords: Criminal law; Judicial error; Burden of proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Working Paper: The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0741
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