Equilibrium in Search Models with Adverse Selection

James Albrecht and Susan Vroman

No 268, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a nonconcavity in the payoff function.

Keywords: Nash equilibria; Informational asymmetry; Search model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1990-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0268

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