Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State

Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg and Jörgen Weibull

No 476, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population fraction adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices, one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers, and one political, how large the transfer should be. The model highlights certain factors determining the size of the welfare state.

Keywords: Welfare Economics; Decision Making; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D81 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0476

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