What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?
Jörgen Weibull
No 487, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Abstract:
Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics. Only recently has this approach been brought into the framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to evolutionary forces in the context of games played many times in large populations of boundedly rational agents. This new strand in economic theory has lead to new predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion will be focused on the following questions: What distinguishes the evolutionary approach from the rationalistic? What are the most important findings in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges for evolutionary game theory in economics?
Keywords: Game theory; Evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1997-09-16, Revised 1998-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
https://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0487.pdf.zip (application/pdf)
https://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0487.pdf (application/pdf)
https://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0487.ps.zip (application/postscript)
https://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0487.ps (application/postscript)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0487
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().