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Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

Jörgen Weibull and Eric van Damme

No 501, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intented. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2-coordination games.

Keywords: Evolution; Game theory; Mutations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1998-08-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-evo and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, pages 296-315.

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Working Paper: Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs (1999) Downloads
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