Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

Eric van Damme and Jörgen Weibull

No 525, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. This is shown to corroborate the results in Kandori-Mailath-Rob (1993) and, under certain regularity conditions, those in Young (1993). The approach also yields a new refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is logically independent of Selten's (1975) perfection concept and Myerson's (1978) properness concept.

Keywords: Game theory; Evolutionary game theory; refinement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1999-12-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, pages 296-315.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities (1999)
Working Paper: Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities (1999)
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