The Insiders' Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation

Tobias Lindqvist () and Johan Stennek
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Johan Stennek: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

No 563, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper tests the insiders' dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders' dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Kamien and Zang, 1990 and 1993). The experimental data provides support for the insiders' dilemma, and thereby for endogenous rather than exogenous merger theory. More surprisingly, our data suggests that fairness considerations also make profitable mergers difficult. Mergers that should occur in equilibrium do not, since they require an unequal split of surplus.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Experiment; Insiders' Dilemma; Mergers; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 G34 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2001-09-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Insiders’ Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation (2005)
Working Paper: The Insiders' Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation (2005)
Working Paper: The Insiders' Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0563

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