Ethnic Diversity and Civil War

Thomas Tangerås () and Nils-Petter Lagerlof ()

No 589, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We construct a model in which a number of equally powerful ethnic groups compete for power by engaging in civil war. In non-redistributive equilibrium, ethnically homogeneous and ethnically diverse countries face a lower probability of civil war than countries with a moderate degree of ethnic diversity. The likelihood of conflict is maximized when there are two ethnic groups. When rent-extraction possibilities are not too big and society sufficiently ethnically homogeneous, there also exists a pacific equilibrium path sustained by redistribution from the ruling group to the out-of-power groups.

Keywords: Civil War; Ethnic Diversity; Redistribution; Dynamic Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H56 J15 K42 N40 N47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2002-10-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mfd and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0589

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