Do Mergers Result in Collusion?
Mattias Ganslandt () and
Pehr-Johan Norbäck ()
No 621, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics
We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions result in "coordinated effects". In particular, higher market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and, consequently, the relevance of simple "checklists" in merger control can be questioned.
Keywords: Merger Control; Collusion; Coordinated Effects; Oligopolistic Dominance; Competition Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0621
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