EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market

Pär Holmberg

No 756, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers’ market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are substitutes). The optimal contracting level of a risk-neutral producer is determined by the extent to which strategies are substitutes and the slope of the residual demand in the forward market. Conditions under which strategies are substitutes are identified for a two-stage game with supply function competition and capacity constrained producers.

Keywords: Supply Function Equilibrium; Forward Market; Strategic Contracting; Arbitrage; Strategic Substitutes; Oligopoly; Electricity Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2008-06-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ene, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Holmberg, Pär, 'Strategic Forward Contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market' in Energy Journal, 2011, pages 169-202.

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp756.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0756

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0756