Are Married Spouses Insured by their Partners’ Social Insurance?

Martin Olsson and Peter Skogman Thoursie ()

No 875, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We use a Swedish sickness insurance reform to show that among married couples a partner’s benefit level affects spousal labour supply. The spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner’s benefit is estimated to be 0.4, which is about one-fourth of the own labor supply elasticity. It is argued the main part of this effect is an insurance income effect.

Keywords: Spousal labor supply; Spill-over; Social insurance programs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 J13 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2011-06-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-lab
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https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp875.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Are Married Spouses Insured by their Partners’ Social Insurance? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0875

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