Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts

Nicholas Economides () and Joacim Tåg

No 890, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price discrimination but no exclusive contracts; and (iv) no regulation: the network operator can sell exclusive rights to content providers. We compare the equilibrium outcomes explicitly accounting for dynamic incentives to invest in improving the Quality of Service offered to each content provider. We provide a ranking Quality of Service and network operator profits across regimes.

Keywords: Network neutrality; Internet price discrimination; Exclusivity; Quality of Service; Network management; Congestion; AT&T; Verizon; Google (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 D40 D42 D43 L10 L12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-12-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, Brown, Ian (eds.), 2012, chapter 6, Edward Elgar.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts (2011)
Working Paper: Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0890

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