International Network Competition

Thomas Tangerås () and Joacim Tåg

No 1005, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We provide conditions under which each of these policies increase efficiency and aggregate welfare. Our findings provide theoretical support for recent policy initiatives by the European Commission.

Keywords: Cross-border ownership; Decentralized regulation; International markets; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2014-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-net and nep-reg
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Published as Tangerås, Thomas and Joacim Tåg, 'International network competition under national regulation' in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, pages 152-185.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1005

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