Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements

Henrik Horn and Thomas Tangerås (thomas.tangeras@ifn.se)

No 1140, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that protect foreign investment against host country policies. We show that optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation ("regulatory chill"). The incentives to form agreements and their distributional consequences depend on countries’unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment ‡ows. The bene…ts from agreements between developed countries accrue to foreign investors at the expense of the rest of society, but this is not the case for agreements between developed and developing countries.

Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Expropriation; International investment agreements; Regulatory chill (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F23 F53 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 66 pages
Date: 2016-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1140.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (2017)
Working Paper: Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1140

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