Public Finance and Right-Wing Populism
Linuz Aggeborn () and
Lovisa Persson ()
Additional contact information
Linuz Aggeborn: Department of Government, Postal: Uppsala University
No 1182, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics
We build a public finance model that explains why voters vote for right-wing populists, and also under which conditions established politicians will adopt a right-wing populist policy platform. Voters with lower private income have a stronger demand for basic public services at the expense of spending on a global good; generosity of refugee support systems, foreign aid, and environmental protection. Low income voters are thus more prone to support right-wing populists who oppose spending on such global goods. We conclude that established politicians that are challenged by right-wing populists will implement a policy with no global good spending if the relative cost of the global good is high enough. Additionally, adoption of right-wing populist policy is more likely when the economy is in a recession.
Keywords: Right-wing populism; Agency; Immigration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 H39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1182
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().