The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited

Lars-Gunnar Svensson

No 1999:1, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is first proved in the case with only two individuals in the economy. The many individual case follows then from an induction argument (over the number of individuals). The proof of the theorem is further simplified when the voting rule is assumed to be neutral.

Keywords: voting; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1999-03-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/papers/lunewp1999_001.ps.zip (application/postscript)
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/papers/lunewp1999_001.ps (application/postscript)
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/papers/lunewp1999_001.pdf.zip (application/pdf)
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/papers/lunewp1999_001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:1999_001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-22007 Lund, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Iker Arregui Alegria ().