Politically Correct Information Adoption

Hakan Holm

No 2000:5, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted information is biased towards “political correctness” rather than being informative (in the Blackwell sense). These results may be relevant when designing decision mechanisms for institutions that are to be keen on new information.

Keywords: Informativeness; Majority Rule; Political Correctness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D70 D72 D81 L30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2000-07-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2000_005

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