Trust in surveys and games - a matter of money and location?

Hakan Holm and Paul Nystedt ()
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Paul Nystedt: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

No 2005:26, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores methods to study trust. Answers to survey questions and choices in a trust game are obtained from subjects approached by mail executing their tasks at home as well as from classroom subjects. No discernable differences between the results obtained by these methods were observed. Furthermore, one group of subjects played the trust game with hypothetical payments. This changed trust behavior dramatically, whereas trustworthiness was unaffected. Subjects without financial incentives exhibited less trust. Trust choices with hypothetical payments were significantly correlated with survey trust answers whereas there was no such correlation for the corresponding choices with real payments.

Keywords: Trust; Financial incentives; Location; Survey answers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C81 C90 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005-04-07, Revised 2005-08-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, 2008, pages 522-542.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_026

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