Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
Tommy Andersson and
Lars-Gunnar Svensson
No 2007:3, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. We define an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrate that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, it is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.
Keywords: Indivisibles; fairness; weak fairness; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2007-02-21, Revised 2007-07-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations:
Published as Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 'Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness' in Review of Economic Design, 2008, pages 321-338.
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Journal Article: Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness (2008)
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