Detection Biases in Bluffing

Hakan Holm

No 2008:4, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender’s message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.

Keywords: Bluffing; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie detection; Detection bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2008-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/195337813/WP08_4 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2008_004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-22007 Lund, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Iker Arregui Alegria ().