Face-to-Face Lying – an experimental study in Sweden and Japan
Hakan Holm and
Toshiji Kawagoe ()
Additional contact information
Toshiji Kawagoe: Department of Complex Systems, Postal: Department of Complex Systems, Future University, Hakodate, Japan
No 2008:5, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of too much truth-telling (compared to the equilibrium prediction) also holds in the face-to-face setting. A new result is that although many people claim that they are good at lie-detection, few reveal belief in this ability when money is at stake. Correlations between the subjects’ characteristics and their behavior and performances in the game are also explored.
Keywords: Lying; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie-detection; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2008-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, 2010, pages 310-321.
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Journal Article: Face-to-face lying - An experimental study in Sweden and Japan (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2008_005
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