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On the Cost-vs-Quality Tradeoff in Make-or-Buy Decisions

Fredrik Andersson ()

No 2010:2, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple two-task principal-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal faces a dichotomous choice between weak ("make") and strong ("buy") cost-saving incentives for the agent; the dichotomy is due to an incomplete-contracting limitation necessitating that one party be residual claimant. Choosing "buy" rather than "make" leads to higher cost-saving effort and -- in a plausible "main case" -- to lower quality effort; this in spite of stronger direct quality-provision incentives in the former case.

Keywords: make-or-buy decision; manipulation; outsourcing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L24 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-26
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